Projects per year
Driverless vehicles are expected to form the foundation of future connected transport infrastructure. A key weakness of connected vehicles is their vulnerability to physical-proximity attacks such as sensor saturation attacks. It is natural to study whether such attacks can be used to disrupt swarms of autonomous vehicles used as part of a large fleet providing taxi and courier delivery services. In this paper, we start to examine the strategic options available to attackers and defenders (autonomous-fleet operators) in such conflicts. We find that attackers have the upper hand in most cases and are able to carry out crippling denial-of-service attacks on fleets, by leveraging the inherent deficiencies of road networks identified by techniques from graph analysis. Experimental results on ten cities using real-world courier traces shows that most cities will require upgraded infrastructure to defend driverless vehicles against denial-of-service attacks. We found several hidden costs that impact equipment designers and operators of driverless vehicles - not least, that road-networks need to be redesigned for robustness against attacks thus raising some fundamental questions about the benefits.
|Place of Publication||Ithica, N.Y.|
|Number of pages||15|
|Publication status||E-pub ahead of print - 25 Jul 2019|
- security economics
- network security
- robot control
- control systems security
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- 3 Finished
1/10/18 → 15/02/23
Project: Research Studentship Case - Internally allocated
1/04/18 → 20/07/19